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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 11-2718 
_____________ 
 
ALTOR, INC., and/or 
AVCON, INC., and/or 
VASILIOS SAITES, individually, 
and NICHOLAS SAITES, individually, 
 
                      Petitioners, 
 
v. 
 
SECRETARY OF LABOR, 
 
                     Respondent 
 
_____________                        
 
No. 11-4077 
_____________ 
 
 
SECRETARY OF LABOR, 
 
                     Petitioner 
v. 
 
ALTOR, INC., and/or 
AVCON, INC., and/or 
VASILIOS SAITES, individually, 
and NICHOLAS SAITES, individually, 
 
                                                    Respondents 
 
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission 
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(Docket No. 99-0958) 
Before: Thomasina V. Rogers, Chairman, and  
Horace A. Thompson III & Cynthia L. Atwood, Commissioners 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 9, 2012 
 
Before:  FUENTES, HARDIMAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: August 31, 2012)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 Altor, Inc. (“Altor”) and Avcon, Inc. (“Avcon”) (collectively, “Appellants”) ask 
this Court to reverse an Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission’s (the 
“Commission”) April 26, 2011 decision and order.  Appellants argue that the 
Commission erred by (1) concluding that Altor and Avcon constituted a “single 
employer” under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (the “OSH Act”), (2) assessing 
separate penalties for six similar, willful fall protection violations; and (3) increasing an 
Administrative Law Judge’s penalty assessment to the amount the Secretary initially 
sought.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm.1
I. 
 
                                                 
1  The Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission had jurisdiction under 
sections 10(a) and 10(c) of the OSH Act.  29 U.S.C. § 659(a), (c).  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 660(a). 
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 Because we write primarily for the parties, we set forth only the facts and history 
relevant to our conclusion. 
 Altor and Avcon were New Jersey corporations engaged in the business of poured-
in-place concrete construction.  Vasilios (“Bill”) Saites was the president and director of 
both companies.  He was also a minority shareholder (49%) in Avcon, and his wife, 
Cornelia Saites, held a 51% majority in Avcon.  The record does not indicate who owned 
Altor.  Bill Saites’ son, Nicholas (“Nick”) Saites, was an attorney licensed in New Jersey 
who provided legal advice to both companies.  Nick Saites was the director of Altor 
during its incorporation, but relinquished that role.  During the period relevant to this case, 
Nick Saites was also a superintendent and worksite supervisor for Avcon.   
 In 1998, Altor contracted with Daibes Brothers, a general contractor, to do the 
concrete work on a sixteen-story apartment building in Edgewater, New Jersey known as 
the Mariner High Rise (the “Edgewater Project”).  As director of both Altor and Avcon, 
Bill Saites subcontracted a portion of Altor’s work to Avcon, signing the contract on 
behalf of each company.  Pursuant to the contract, Altor provided materials and supplies, 
and Avcon, which had access to union labor, performed the labor at the Edgewater 
Project.  Altor remained responsible to Daibes Brothers for the concrete work under their 
initial contract.   
 Shortly after Edgewater Project construction began, the Occupational Health and 
Safety Administration (“OSHA”) began an inspection of the site.  The OSHA inspectors 
observed numerous fall protection, safety equipment, and administrative safety program 
violations.  OSHA thus issued citations to Bill and Nick Saites—individually and doing 
 4 
business as Altor and/or Avcon—alleging willful, serious, and other than serious 
violations of OSH Act standards, with proposed penalties totaling $424,000.2
 Altor, Avcon, Bill Saites, and Nick Saites appealed the citations to an ALJ.  Since 
the Secretary’s complaint did not allege that Altor was an employer of employees at the 
Edgewater Project, Altor and Avcon must have been a “single employer” under the OSH 
Act if they were to share liability for the violations.  The ALJ found that evidence 
established that Altor and Avcon were a single employer because the “companies [had] 
interrelated and integrated operations with a common president, management, 
supervision and ownership performing services at a common worksite.”  App. 81.  
Additionally, the ALJ affirmed the six willful fall protection violations and did not group 
them together.  However, the ALJ stated that the assessed penalty of $336,000 for the fall 
protection violations was excessive and issued a combined penalty of $150,000 ($25,000 
for each willful fall protection citation). 
  However, 
a timely notice of contest was filed, and, by an amended complaint, Altor and Avcon 
were added as individual respondents. 
 Appellants then appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Commission.  The 
Commission agreed with the ALJ that Altor and Avcon constituted a single employer.  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Commission found that the companies shared a common 
workspace (the Edgewater Project), were “plainly interrelated and integrated,” and 
“shared a common president, management, and supervision.”  App. 13-14.  The 
                                                 
2  OSH Act violations are characterized as “willful,” “repeated,” “serious,” or “not 
serious” (referred to by the Commission as “other than serious”).  29 U.S.C. § 666. 
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Commission also affirmed the ALJ’s refusal to group the six willful fall protection 
violations.  However, the Commission set aside the ALJ’s penalty assessment and 
imposed the penalties originally proposed by the Secretary, $56,000 for each willful fall 
protection citation, or a total of $336,000.   
 Appellants timely filed with this Court a petition for review of the Commission’s 
order. 
 
 
II. 
 On appeal, Altor and Avcon challenge both the Commission’s determination that 
Altor and Avcon constitute a single employer under the OSH Act and its decision to 
assess individual penalties for each of the six willful fall protection violations and to 
increase the ALJ’s penalty assessment for these citations. 
A. 
 It is well established that separate corporate entities can constitute a single 
employer under the OSH Act.  The Act defines “employer” as “a person engaged in a 
business affecting commerce who has employees.”  29 U.S.C. § 652(5).  It goes on to 
define “person” as “one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, 
business trusts, legal representatives, or any organized group of persons.”  29 U.S.C. § 
652(4).  Whether multiple entities constitute a single employer under the OSH Act is a 
question of fact, and the Commission’s conclusion must be upheld if supported by 
substantial evidence.  See 29 U.S.C. § 660(a); Bianchi Trison Corp. v. Secretary, 409 
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F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2005); see also NLRB v. Al Bryant, Inc., 711 F.2d 543, 551 (3d Cir. 
1983) (“The single employer question is primarily factual, and the Board’s conclusion 
must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence.”).3
 We look to four factors to determine whether multiple separate entities in fact 
constitute a single employer: (1) interrelated operations; (2) common management; (3) 
centralized control of labor relations; and (4) common ownership.  Al Bryant, 711 F.2d at 
551.  While no factor is dispositive, the first three are more significant.  Id.   
 
 Altor and Avcon argue that they were separate entities because each company was 
engaged in different aspects of the construction business.  Altor and Avcon’s relationship, 
however, exhibited a lack of arm’s length dealing, and the Commission properly 
concluded that the companies were a single employer.  First, the companies’ operations 
were substantially interrelated.  Avcon only performed work pursuant to contracts with 
Altor, and Altor always remained responsible to the general contractors for Avcon’s work.  
Further, Bill Saites signed contracts for both corporations, and the companies shared a 
single-room office.  Second, Bill Saites was the director and manager of both companies, 
satisfying common management.  Third, labor relations were centralized because Bill and 
Nick Saites, as representatives for both Altor and Avcon, were the onsite supervisors at 
                                                 
3  The Commission “essentially adopted” the single employer test that was 
developed by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).  See C.T. Taylor Co. v. Esprit 
Constructors, Inc., 2003 OHSHRC LEXIS 43, at *9-*10 (Apr. 26, 2003).  Thus, it is 
instructive to look to NLRB cases to elucidate the single employer concept.  Indeed, we 
have applied the NLRB’s test in a wide variety of employment and labor law contexts to 
determine whether separate entities constitute a single employer.  See Pearson v. 
Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 486 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing cases applying this test 
in various employment contexts). 
 7 
the Edgewater Project and had authority to terminate employees and to enforce safety 
regulations.  Fourth, the Saites family closely held control over Altor and Avcon, and this 
constitutes common ownership.  See NLRB v. Dane Cnty. Dairy, 795 F.2d 1313, 1322 
(7th Cir. 1986) (“Familial control constitutes common ownership and control.”); accord 
J.M. Tanaka Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 Accordingly, we find that the Commission’s holding that Altor and Avcon 
constituted a single employer is supported by substantial evidence.   
 
B. 
 The Commission has wide discretion to assess penalties for OSH Act violations 
within the Act’s statutory allowable range.  See 29 U.S.C. § 666.  Therefore, we will 
overturn the Commission’s penalty assessment only for an abuse of discretion.  See 29 
U.S.C. § 666(j); Chao v. OSHRC, 401 F.3d 355, 376 (5th Cir. 2005) (“This Court reviews 
the Commission’s determination of the amount of an OSH Act penalty for abuse of 
discretion.”); Modern Cont’l Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 305 F.3d 43, 53 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 The OSH Act permits the Commission to penalize willful violations with a fine of 
between $5,000 and $70,000 for each violation.4
                                                 
4  The Secretary has the discretion to charge violations individually or to group 
them together in the first instance.  But, the Commission is then obligated to assess the 
minimum penalty “for each willful violation” that is proved.  29 U.S.C. 666(a) (emphasis 
added).  Insomuch as Altor and Avcon seek a reduction in their total penalty, the 
available relief is for the Commission to lower the penalty for each willful citation 
individually (rather than “grouping” the willful violations, as Appellants request). 
  29 U.S.C. § 666(a).  The Commission 
must “giv[e] due consideration to the appropriateness of the penalty with respect to the 
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size of the business of the employer being charged, the gravity of the violation, the good 
faith of the employer, and the history of previous violations” when assessing a penalty 
within the broad statutory range.  29 U.S.C. § 666(j).  “The gravity of a particular 
violation may warrant the assessment of a weighty penalty, even though the employer 
may rate perfect marks on the other three criteria.”  See Modern Cont’l Constr. Co. 305 
F.3d at 53 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Altor and Avcon argue that the six willful fall protection violations should be 
grouped together and that a lower penalty should be assessed because the companies had 
less than 100 employees, their employees were only exposed to danger for three weeks, 
no actual injuries occurred, and the companies did take some level of precaution to 
prevent falls.   
 However, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in giving substantial weight 
to the violations’ gravity and assessing a penalty at the upper end of the statutorily 
allowable range.  The six separate fall protections violations were all willful violations.  
Though it focused its attention on the violations’ gravity, the Commission adequately 
considered all of the relevant factors in assessing the penalty.  The record indicates that 
employees were regularly exposed to risks of falling over 79 feet, a fall that would likely 
result in death.  Accordingly, the Commission did not abuse its discretion in assessing the 
penalty initially sought by the Secretary.  
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the Commission’s order. 
